I find it gratuitous to assume that a Hopi who knows only the Hopi language and the cultural ideas of his own society has the same notions, often supposed to be intuitions, of time and space that we have, and that are generally assumed to be universal. In particular, he has no general notion or intuition of TIME as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past; or, in which, to reverse the picture, the observer is being carried in the stream of duration continuously away from a past and into a future. (Benjamin Lee Whorf, 1936Y Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject -in the form of historical consciousness -will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode. Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought. (Michel Foucault 1969) 2 Czech theorist Jan Mukarovsky argued in the 1930S that every narrative art form imposes restrictions that shape its representations of time. 3 In the English Renaissance, the expansion of literacy accelerated by the introduction of printing began to support narrative forms defined by the division of representation into uniform and repeatable analytical units. By substituting the regularity of their own consistent procedures for the integrity of the larger 'reality' (or older representational structure) they presumed to represent, these forms opened the perception of time and event to interpretation as limited causal sequences.
In Renaissance drama the development of the sequential plot provided a prototype for a linear and causal explication of time, long before such an explanation reached the threshold of conscious analysis. Renaissance historiographers have generally emphasized the conservatism of Renaissance attitudes towards time, in which past events were viewed primarily as non-sequential (or cyclical) moral analogues to the present. 4 Yet as UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY, VOLUME 59, NUMBER 4 , SUMMER 1990 Ricardo Quinones has argued, time and sequence emerge as fundamental categories of the drama, and nowhere is this more apparent than in revenge tragedy, in which the perceiving 'subject' gradually became visible, not as located and enmeshed within a network of immanent social relations, but as isolated and defined against the temporal and causal sequence of a personal'fate.'5 But while Quinones has tended to view drama largely in a documentary rather than constructive role, drama and other associated narrative forms in the Renaissance were more than just reflections: they were part of the developing technology of literacy itself and participated in its restructuring of the basic categories of knowledge. And as such they constituted, as Mukarovsky has suggested, a new circumstance with its own developmental rules, a circumstance which not only called forth the idea of sequential and causal time, but demanded its evolution.
FORM AND METHOD IN THE RENAISSANCE
In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue Walter Ong argued that the emphasis on 'method' in such Renaissance writers as Ramus was closely related to the introduction of print and its attendant construction of a more clearly 'literate' conceptual economy. 6 Yet the operation of such Renaissance literary forms as the sonnet as 'methods' (repeatable procedures independent of particular applications) significantly antedates Ramus's formulation, demonstrating once again the tendency of developments to occur on the level of structure considerably before their representation on the level of conscious analysis. Revenge tragedy, like commercial drama in general and other forms such as the sonnet, operated as a 'method' characterized by a set of highly regular and closely interrelated structural features that included restricted length, formal standardization, and repetitive application across a wide range of 'content.' Specifically, these features meant that forms such as revenge tragedy operated by dividing representation into a series of limited, but formally consistent units. By both dividing and segmenting representation into discrete units and maintaining a structural consistency among units, these forms eroded the integrity of the larger representational categories they consistently divided while asserting the stability of the analytical forms (plays, sonnets) they consistently repeated. They thus promoted both their own operations as 'methods' and the perceiving subjects they defined at the expense of the integrity of the 'content' they appeared to represent.
The sonnet form is typical of these changes. While sonnets typically were grouped in sequences of perhaps a hundred or more that appeared to represent some larger 'content' such as a love affair, the formal structure of individual sonnets presumed enough closure to encourage their perception, even within the sequence, as at least partially selfcontained, individual units. The sequence thus appeared, not as a seamless narrative continuity modulated by strophic verse, but rather as a series of individual reflections or 'moments' excerpted metonymically from the idea of some larger, ongoing experiential 'reality.' Yet it is only through the representation of these moments that this larger 'continuity' remains visible at all, and the operation of the sequence clearly imposes a pattern of selection: the sequence selects those 'moments' that are 'significant' and worthy of representation from those other aspects of the presumed 'experience' that fall below the threshold of representation and are lost in the enforced boundaries between sonnets -the white spaces on the page. The sequence thus asserts its control over 'experience,' first by 'editing' its representation and selecting only those aspects most suitable to its particular method of analysis, and second by imposing a strict regularity on those aspects it chooses to present as a sequence of measured and consistent units.
The consistent internal structure of the sonnet places further limitations, not only on what is represented and what is not, but on how representations that are presented are structured and understood. The rhymed 14-line 14o-syllable structure of the sonnet enforces both regularity and closure, while the argumentative structure of the sonnet enforces an organization that is both closed and procedural: the thematic concern that the sonnet introduces (in the octave or quatrains) must be formally resolved within the boundaries established by the form (in the sestet or couplet), and thus only matters subject to such rapid problematization and resolution are amenable to representation. Furthermore, since this pattern of difficulty and success, tension and release, is repetitive, it builds with every iteration an underlying confidence in the efficacy of the sonnet as a recurrent, generic form. It is, in fact, precisely because this same form appears to resolve crisis after crisis in the range of developing and varying 'situations' that the sonnet's claims as a generic method appear so strong: the sonnet replaces the fragmentation of its 'objects,' achieved through their division into the structured representations of its individual units, with the consistency of its own form, which always remains generically and successfully 'the same' in every application.
The effect of these procedures is apparent on the level of presumed 'content.' Those thematic features most closely associated with the sonnet's' object world,' typically the woman who is presented as opposite to and other than the speaker, is, though often idealized, typically fragmented in her representation, presented through the sequence as an aggregate of parts and partial views. Similarly, that aspect of the speaker most involved in this 'represented world' and most closely associated with the woman -the emotional and involved speaker whose fluctuations in moods and experiences are rendered even more acute by the discontinuities of the sequence's segmented representations -also appears as volatile and unreliable. But the speaker is also distinguished by a second role: as poet and speaker it is precisely in overcoming the inconsistencies of his experience and methodically reducing them to the ordered and consistent form of the sonnet that he asserts his integrity as a formally distinct and 'objective' integrated subject. 7 Thus he constructs an objective 'history' of the varied events of his past through their assimilation in a rationalized framework. The sonnet thus substituted in place of larger interpretive structures (such as the analogical schemes of Aquinas and Dante) within which individual subjects were located, a consistent pattern of sequential analysis effected by the subject himself.
Commercial drama presented, in many respects, a more radical extension of these principles. By removing the closed formal structures of individual plays from the yearly ritual of church and guild performances and church mythology and recontextualizing them within the randomized pattern of commercial repertory, commercial drama asserted their operation as a series of discrete, repetitive, and discontinuous formal units. The closure of individual units became, if anything, more complete: though, as Quinones points out, Shakespeare's early history plays formed a temporal sequence (a feature also found in early Greek tragedy), later plays, and later tragedies in particular, did not. 8 And even in cases in which thematic sequences exist among plays, there was no necessity for audiences to experience plays, or even the works of anyone writer, in any particular order. The perceptual world of drama thus became one of more radically separate views, further punctuated by their separation, as 'representations,' from the activities of daily life. The dramatic form thus extended significantly the disassembly of perception already under way in the sonnets. And, like the sonnet, the theatre asserted against this pattern of dispersal a consistency of circumstances and methods: as the printed page and the fourteen-line visual block eventually became the stable context of the sonnet, the dedicated space of the theatre, employing the same props and the same actors play after play, became the stable context for the drama. The theatre, like the sonnet, asserted the efficacy of a single general paradigm or method -the play -in not only isolating and identifying a single aspect of experience (a moment of history, a convoluted romance, the killing of a king), but in resolving it into a regular pattern of predictable completion and significance. And it did so repeatedly, play after play, over an even broader range of materials.
Both the sonnet and drama in this way countered, or rather complemented, the disassembly of their represented 'materials' with the consistency of their own techniques, thus shifting the locus of stability from 'the world' within which representation occurred, to the form or 'method' of representation itself. The sonnet or play asserted itself as a generic method that might be applied to a range of situations with the expectation of equivalent results. The procedure itself, though formally restrictive, thus presented itself as an adequate model for the understanding of a wide range of phenomena, and argued as well other ways of thinking (based, for instance, on the integrity or indivisibility of a 'whole') to be of little further value or consequence. The sonnet and play argued, during their brief history as central English literary forms, for a very basic and essential kind of victory of 'form' over 'content,' or of 'method' (a favourite Ramist term) over 'materials.'9 And although both sonnet and drama as forms did not survive their own procedures (for reasons to be considered below), the principles they introduced, the perceptual and analytical divisibility of experience and the standardization and recursion of generic methods, did survive as codified habits of thought. The consistency of these techniques replaced the integrity of the represented 'content' they so systematically divided, becoming an argument for the habitual division and segmentation of experience into the partial, equivalent, and essentially arbitrary units of early scientific thought -the mastery of 'method' over the world it sought to represent. And they argued as well for the existence of an individual perceiving 'subject' who was defined by the very standardization of these techniques.
DRAMA AND PROGRESSION
Though the progression from statement of problem to resolution in the individual sonnet argued for a form of progression, as does the development of themes in a sequence as a whole, the major argument of the sonnet was for its own completion, the permanence of its own 'monumental' form against those very changes it described: the sonnet, in this sense, aspired to stasis.1O While not entirely abandoning this theme, drama advanced an 'internal' argument that was considerably more sophisticated, making explicit that 'causality' that the two-part structure of the sonnet had only begun to imply. In arguing for the primacy of 'plot' in tragedy, Aristotle had argued that A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be. An end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing, either by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle is that which follows something as some other thing follows it. A well constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at haphazard, but conform to these principles. l l This abstract and self-reflexive definition argues that the actions of drama are only 'complete' in the sense that they form an internal sequence, a progression between 'a beginning, a middle, and an end,' that functions as a whole only in that its three parts are linked by relationships of 'causal necessity.' By such a definition, the repetitive units of drama (individual plays) thus function as models of a simple linear causality, in which the initial 'cause' (the 'beginning' that does not appear as the immediate 'effect' of anything else) leads onwards towards some final 'effect' (the 'end' that does not appear to be the immediate 'cause' of anything else). By this definition, everything within the play fits within this causal relation, while nothing extends, in any 'necessary' way, beyond it. And though Aristotle's principles of dramatic construction were honoured even in their own day more by variation than adherence, and though observers of Renaissance drama have repeatedly pointed to features other than narrowly linear plots as definitive, the emergence within Renaissance drama of ordered and recognized plot sequences points to the development of drama as a significant and highly rationalized model of causality and time. 12 Finally, the perception of the world as divided into such compartmentalized instances of cause-and-effect is closely related to the development of drama itself as a sequentially produced and incremental 'literary' form. Though the relationship between changes in formal structure and increased literacy and print has been explicated in some detail in the last thirty years by writers such as Ong, Havelock, McLuhan, Stock, and Gellrich, one of the most provocative explanations may be found in a 1929 article entitled 'Folklore as a Special Form of Creativity,' by Petr Bogatyrev and Roman Jakobson. 13 In this article, Bogatyrev and Jakobson attempted to distinguish folkloric from 'literary' production on the basis of social function. Folkloric production, occurring in societies in which the primary means of communication are oral, serves a record-keeping function. The primary values in folkloric production are then repetition and continuity on the level of 'content': individuals might modify the performance (or 'form') of a story without being perceived as modifying the story itself, which is thought to be fixed and inviolable. No particular premium is placed on innovation, and the performance is in no way thought to be the 'property' of the individual performer.
Under more 'literary' conditions, however, the reverse is true. Since record-keeping functions are largely absorbed by other specialized forms of writing (which need, in general, to be written only once), very little face value is placed on repetition in specifically 'literary' or 'artistic' production. While the closure of individual works is, on one hand, enforced by their graphic representation (their containment in books, manuscripts, and pages), thus making 'sequences' not only possible but inevitable, writers are, on the other, faced with the necessity to demonstrate some form of 'originality' so as to differentiate their work from others that have already preceded them in stable, written form. 14 The regard for 'literary' productions as intellectual property is an index of this change. Artists may work within existing forms because of their efficiency, the difficulty of devising new ones, and the ready access to audiences that existing forms provide. Yet under 'literary' conditions, they are faced with the necessity of constant modification of those forms so as to create the impression of the new, the distinct, and the 'individual/: the market for representation is, in other words, defined not only by the repetitive consistency of its forms or products, but by the corresponding necessity of their differentiation: if audiences could, at any given time, see a production of The Spanish Tragedy at one theatre, they had little reason to go to see a similar play at another. Drama as an industry became an assembly line for the manufacture of a standardized product ('plays') based upon the standardization and interchangeability of its parts (actors, roles, costumes, etc) and techniques (methodological analysis), but also on the necessity of their recombination into 'new' and persistently differentiated forms.
Under such circumstances, drama in both the classical and Renaissance periods assumed a central position in the transition from more 'folkloric' to a more 'literary' culture. Drama functioned as a transitional device. The social role of the artist changed from one of 'performer' to one of 'creator.' And the development of drama itself functioned as a model for progressive change, a dialectic between production and reception, modifying the expectations of its audience by enforcing neologism, while always building upon the stable base of the 'known' (that which defined 'the old' or cliched). By advancing in a dialectic defined between consumers and producers drama advanced through a 'causality' that was, in fact, quite 'logical.' Like the sonnets, drama operated as a self-modifying form that both reprocessed its materials and 'contents,' and eventually eroded the enabling circumstances of its own operation. But in a much more direct sense than the sonnet, drama was eventually to incorporate within its own structure a consciousness of this pattern of change and an attempt to understand its own significance: the instrument of this understanding was the dramatic 'plot' that became a model both for the sequential and progressive conception of time and for its own unfolding representational operations. 15 Commercial 'literate' drama did more than simply document change: it absorbed it as its own most basic principle and made it virtually inevitable. This speech, by Balthazar of Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy, suggests not only a particularly 'causal' form of reasoning, but many of the main themes that are later to be more fully articulated in the development of revenge tragedy as a whole. I? The speech itself consists of eighteen lines, each of which advances the causal structure of the argument by a single step. Its rhetorical structure emphasizes the incremental nature of these connections: each line presents a simple causal argument ('cause' leading to 'effect'), but the lines are linked to each other through repetition, the final term or 'effect' of one line immediately repeated as the initial term or 'cause' of the next (anadiplosis, gradatio). Thus, in 199-23 'hand' leads to 'sword,' 'sword'leads to 'war,' 'war'leads to 'wounds,' 'wounds' leads to 'yeeld,' and 'yeelding' leads to 'slaue.' In 124-8 the process is repeated, with 'mouth' leading to 'words,' 'words' leading to 'deceits,' 'deceits' leading to 'eares,' 'eares' leading to 'hart,' and 'hart' leading to the idea of replacement, which returns the attention of the sequence to the speaker and prepares for the final statement of the revenge motive in the concluding lines. This transposition of 'effects' to 'causes' thus results in an argumentative structure that, though complicated, progresses through the simple single-step extension of linear causalities through successive stages, with each stage then contributing to the total development of the argument, and marking as well the passage of time.
Though Balthazar as a character seems generally ignorant of its implications, the logic of this speech replicates the major features of revenge causality itself. The revenge relationship consists of two simple causal relationships that become the terms of a third:
Relationship 'a': x kills y (x is the cause, y's death the effect) Relationship 'b': z kills x (z is the cause, x's death the effect)
Linkage: since x killed y, z must kill x ('a' is the cause, 'b' the effect)
This pattern, like the logic of its individual components, is fully recursive (that is, it may be reapplied to its own results). The 'effect' relationship of the entire sequence is not of a kind different than the' cause' relationship: both cases involve one character killing another. Therefore the 'effect' . relationship of one series is quite capable of becoming the 'cause' relationship of another, giving rise to a potentially infinite series of 'causally' motivated actions:
The revenge relationship thus mimics the rhetorical structure of Balthazar's speech: each killing, like the first term in a poetic line, leads directly to the next, the act of revenge, which, like the second term in the line, appears initially as an 'effect.' But each 'effect' or act of revenge, like the second term in one line, becomes in turn the first term or 'cause' of the next relationship (or the next line). Revenge causality thus provides an infinitely expandable, easily motivated plot structure that, like the speech, may build complexity out of simple, repeatable relations. Revenge plots, for the very ease with which they demonstrate their progression through such chains of 'causal necessity,' are archetypal models of causal relation, and can be used to frame and support enormous 'causal' structures, such as the entire epic cycle of the Trojan War, and the thread of 'revenge,' appearing at any given point as the impulsive reaction to a very specific circumstance, can be extended to become the underlying ethic and history of an entire period or culture. The very efficiency of the revenge plot in creating such extended structures, however, produced difficulties for the dramatist faced with the problem of closure. Such 'infinite' chains are better suited to larger structure: in the Greek epics, for instance, the larger structure of revenge operated primarily to provide the locating framework for a whole series of smaller and otherwise unrelated internal actions. Yet even in the epics, the open-ended structure of revenge relationships created a problem of closure: after Odysseus returned to Ithaca and killed the wedding guests (this return itself an obvious symbol of romance closure), he was pursued to the shepherd's hut by a crowd of angry relatives. The revenge of the relatives, if effected, could potentially have given rise to a whole new epic cycle based on the killing and revenge of Odysseus, though such a denouement would defeat the role of The Odyssey in providing closure to the story of the Trojan War. This problem was resolved through the classical deus ex machina, the direct intervention of Athena in the narrative sequence, which brought an end to both the revenge and the entire epic cycle.
Aristotle, of course, specifically disallowed this type of deus ex machina in tragedy on the grounds that it disrupted relationships of cause-andeffect, a disavowal that demonstrates the more visible and central role given to causal relationships, at least in his conception of drama. 18 Drama foregrounds causality both by limiting it to the specific relations of the individual play, and by using it, not as a frame, but as the immediate motivation for all of the play's central actions: as the closure of the individual play limits the perception of 'causality' to a single set of relations coextensive with the boundaries of the play, 'causality' becomes, not a single extensive relationship that underlies and unifies all experience, but rather a single type of relationship that divides reality into a series of discrete, but repetitive explanatory patterns. The modularization of causality in the formal unit of the causal play is perhaps the most significant effect of dramatic structure, in that it converts the notions of causality and revenge from extensive background patterns to limited and repeatable foreground 'methods' and models.
In reducing the indefinite chain of causal revenge relations to the single repeating unit of the play, Renaissance tragedies availed themselves of a second, and in some senses subsidiary aspect of the revenge relationship -its essential reflexivity. The individual revenge relationship is that if x kills y, then z kills x. If this essential pattern is extended through two iterations, so that the avenger in turn becomes the object of a second revenge, then the consequence is ultimately that z too must die as a result of his/her own actions. In effect, to act at all becomes to commit suicide -a particularly strong image of closure that can be expanded to produce the familiar mass disasters of the fifth act. The 'suicide' of the central figure or 'hero' of revenge tragedy guaranteed the modularization of the causal sequence of the play, but its implementation resulted in further complications as the development of revenge tragedy progressed: in relying upon this particularly reflexive aspect of revenge causality and closure, Renaissance drama introduced (or rather recast) a second and more difficult pattern -the pattern of 'individual fate' with its attendant notions of self-interest and predictability. Once these patterns became fully realized and fully conscious, they made the very circumstances of tragedy impossible.
PLOT AND TIME IN 'THE SPANISH TRAGEDY'
Although the ideas of plot, causality, and sequential time were perhaps implicit in the early structure of commercial drama, they began to function as conscious or deliberate aspects of the form only gradually, emerging, as it were, from the implications of the form itself rather than from the explicit intent of their producers. The relationship between the emerging implications of the form and its deployment in the Renaissance is further complicated by the question of classical models: though the Renaissance was able to avail itself of models from an earlier era that had already passed through an extended process of formal development, their usage did not always immediately duplicate or exploit the conceptual sophistication of these earlier models. Revenge tragedies provide a particularly clear example of this process of appropriation and realization, as well as its effects.
Though revenge tragedies were some of the earliest plays to occur in the English Renaissance, they had their origins in an older form, the Senecan tragedies that date from late within the classical period, from a point at which all of the basic forms of classical drama had already been enunciated. By this time, the form of what we now think of as the 'Aristotelian' tragedy of plot and fate had already become integral to 'literary' perception. The logic of this plot no longer 'unfolded,' revealing itself to its audiences, since its fundamental patterns were already known through many plays. Thus Seneca, writing the most 'literary' of tragedies and assuming the causality of plot as a basic structure, dismissed causality itself as a source of interest and looked, not to the causes of actions but to their effects and presentation for the central features of his work. As T.5. Eliot wrote, 'He took a story perfectly well known to everybody, and interested his auditors entirely by embellishments of description and narrative and by smartness and pungency of dialogue; suspense and surprise attached solely to verbal effects. '19 The pattern of the explication and dismissal of causality as a point of interest in classical drama was to be recapitulated in the Renaissance, but not in its early phases: early Renaissance writers imitated Seneca, not because causality was so basic to his plots, but rather because it was so submerged as an assumption. In thus writing 'causal' drama but concentrating attention not upon causality, but on the spectacular nature of its results, Seneca provided a crucial model for the Renaissance, a model within which Renaissance writers could concentrate on spectacle while presenting an implicit image of causality that they themselves were only slowly coming to understand. The most famous of early Renaissance revenges, Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy, already briefly considered above, is typical in this respect: though the plot structure of The Spanish Tragedy is founded in the causal logic of revenge in which the death of one character becomes the 'cause' for which the other actions of the play then appear as 'effects,' it is just this logic, this linkage between 'causes' and 'effects,' that remains most obscure to both the play's characters and its audience, to whom it is made available only in a much reduced and simplified form. 20 Like Hamlet, The Spanish Tragedy begins with the appearance of a ghost -that of Don Andrea, a Spanish nobleman recently killed in battle. This ghost, however, does not appear to the characters of the main action at all and thus does not function as a continual and omnipresent 'cause' for further actions. Rather, the ghost appears only to the audience of the play as part of a two-member chorus that comments intermittently on the progress of the play's action. This chorus, by visibly interpreting the play's actions, becomes, like other such choral groups, a model for audience behaviour, but in this play, its members are distinguished by very different perceptual patterns. The ghost interprets the play through the feudal perception of the world as an essentially fixed system of positions and responsibilities: his death, though not particularly 'wrongful,' is thus primarily meaningful in creating an obligation for his survivors. For the ghost, the world exists in a condition of imbalance, which only the act of revenge can redress. Throughout the play the ghost thus complains of his survivors' slowness in fulfilling their obligation and voices his impatience with the play's representation of apparently superfluous intermediate actions.
Responding to these complaints is the character 'Revenge,' who appears to speak for the processes of the play itself. Revenge argues patience, urging the ghost to watch the actions of the play and assuring him that their progression will inevitably bring him satisfaction.
Thou talkest of haruest, when the corne is greene:
The end is crowne of euery worke well done; The Sickle comes not, till the corne be ripe. Be still; and ere I lead thee from this place: Ile shew thee Balthazar in heauy case. (n.vi. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] In arguing thus for patience and the ghost's indulgence as spectator, Revenge is arguing for the perception of action as both extensive and teleological, an argument very similar to the Aristotelian argument of the tragic plot linked by 'causal necessity,' and a teleological progression from 'beginning' and 'middle' to 'end.' By their connection in a causal chain, the individual actions of the play become significant in that they are now seen to form prerequisites to a desired end. The perception of time as only a change in state is thus replaced with the perception of time as a process through which change is effected, a process both extensive and dependent upon the causal relations.
This argument for 'plot' is also an argument for the play itself in a more practical sense: if the ghost's wishes for immediate action were to be fulfilled and revenge immediately enacted, the actions of the play would end in the first act. It is only through the extension of these actions in time and their perception as a significant causal sequence that the play exists at all: the necessity for causally linked actions thus becomes the very formal necessity allowing for the play itself. In this respect, the very existence of this debate is its most significant feature, since it indicates a profound scepticism on the part of the author about the theatre audience's ability to comprehend the basic form of the play's representational structure: while Revenge represents the play, the ghost represents the audience, potentially bored and impatient, and implicitly incapable of understanding the subtleties of the play's explication of causal patterns. The dialogue between Revenge and the ghost is thus the play's attempt to provide a pedagogy for its own understanding to an audience still operating within an older view of time. The existence of the debate is an indication of the radical nature of the introduction of the Aristotelian 'causal' plot into the conceptual world of the early Renaissance, typically marked, as the historiographers suggest, by a far less causal view. The action of the play becomes a conceptual model for the perception of causal change in an environment that does not already (but will soon quite generally) support it.
Within the plot, this pattern of uncovering and explicating causality and time is replicated in the actions of the play's major characters. Although the death of Don Andrea creates an obligation for his survivors and thus structures the necessity of a future action (the revenge), his survivors appear incapable through the opening sections of the play of constructing a 'causal' sequence through which that action can be brought about. They thus remain, for much of the play, curiously immobile, a condition that the first avenger, Horatio, comes to typify in his death: a paragon of the feudal virtues of loyalty and martial action, Horatio proves to be completely incapable of mastering the intricacies of 'plot' and deception, and is eventually killed by his more cunning rivals and left suspended from a tree. The obligation to revenge then passes to his father Hieronimo, with the passage of obligation from character to character becoming a kind of 'causal' chain through which the actions and causal structure of the plot are further advanced and directed.
Hieronimo, however, is an even more entrenched prototype of the feudal retainer, and, at least initially, is similarly unable to act until the death of his son, subsequent death of his wife, and inaction of his superiors eventually displace him from his feudal role. This displacement thrusts him into the 'individuality' of isolation and the corresponding appearance of madness (the absence of 'normal' definition) while Simultaneously removing from him the inherent restrictions of his feudal place. Action, however 'mad/ thus becomes possible even though its rationale is clearly only barely understood. His eventual revenge, which, again in anticipation of Hamlet, involves the staging of a play-within-aplay, marks his entry into the world of 'causality,' since he must literally construct a 'plot.' Yet this play itself, far from bringing clarity to the sequences of the larger play, remains an icon of confusion for its audience: performed in six languages, it provides the very confusion that allows for the completion of the revenge. As in the larger play, 'causality' thus has the form of mystification -operative, but only partially understood. And Hieronimo, like his victims, thus enters causality, but by experience first, and only later by understanding.
The theatre audience, however, watching this process from their position of 'objectivity,' not only learn from this experience, but survive it, taking both their knowledge and experience to their reception of other plays. And with every play, and every repetition, their knowledge grows stronger, changing the very conditions that new productions must address. As the patterns of classical drama are absorbed, their implications become ever more clear, and the opportunities and restrictions on further dramas increasingly defined.
'HAMLET' AND TIME James Calderwood, in his sophisticated analysis of Hamlet, argues that Hamlet's delay, which forms such a prominent structural feature of the play, is the product, not simply of revenge convention, but of 'Shakespeare's resistance to the structural syntax of revenge tragedy.'21 Syntax, of course, in tragedy is represented most directly by 'plot' -that system of relations through which the objects and events within the play are placed in order. Yet, as Calderwood's argument suggests, there is a considerable difference between the enunciation or formation of a syntactical pattern or a plot convention and its eventual reception or reproduction. Early drama, Nietzsche alleged, was primarily oriented towards character, and the development of plot, by which drama came to be known, was in some respects inimical to that earlier conception. Yet, as Roman Jakobson has suggested in another context, even the simple enunciation of positive terms, when formalized, becomes syntactical. 22 Thus the appearance and development of 'syntax' is in some respects inevitable. An early play such as The Spanish Tragedy appears initially not as a 'plot' or causality at all, but as a collection of characters and problems: it is only as its situations develop to form an explicit pattern, or as they are explicated as such by characters such as Revenge, that they become visible and subject to more deliberate manipulation.
Drama, as part of a transition from a 'folkloric' to a 'literate' conceptual environment, operated in a dialectic of change: audiences began to internalize patterns such as the causal plot to which they were repetitively exposed. As a consequence, drama was no longer defined by the ignorance of the audience, but by their knowledge. As audiences internalized the conventions of the causal plot, that plot became predictive: to know the beginning of a 'plot' was, by convention, to know as well its middle and end. And to know these things, under 'literate' conditions, was to grow intolerant of their constant demonstration. As it had with Sene can tragedy in classical times, with the growing conven-tionality of plot, attention began to shift from the causes and linkages of action, towards its consequences and effects. Thus tragedy advanced in a dialectic of knowledge and change with its audience, in which each absorption of knowledge by the audience forced a restructuring of convention by the artist. And in this sense, Shakespeare did not so much 'resist' the conventions of the causal plot as he did acknowledge their changing functionality with respect to the predictive and conventional knowledge of the audience: he simply acknowledged their internalization of the causal perception of time.
It was at this juncture, however, that the particular form of closure afforded by the revenge plot began to present a serious problem: implicit in the progression of the revenge plot is the death of the revenger. Yet this somewhat suicidal outcome remains rational only to the extent that the character involved in its decisions does not understand causal time: Hieronimo 'discovers' his death at the end of the play only, as it were, by accident, as a kind of by-product of his obligation and decisions and his dislocation from the 'meaningful' values of feudal life, factors which remain far more central to his actions. He does not, in this sense, choose death, but has death thrust upon him, and since his life, now bereft of other feudal locations, has become 'meaningful' only in terms ofrevenge, he no longer cares. But this is a situation that was drastically to be changed in later plays, in which 'causality' and convention played a far more central and explicit role.
Consider, for example, the case of an audience that has been educated in the causalities and conventions of revenge tragedy through their exposure to The Spanish Tragedy and many other such plays. Such an audience, viewing a new play that begins with the appearance of a ghost who announces his wrongful murder and calls upon his survivors to avenge it, would identify that playas a revenge. And, in knowing the 'causality' of the revenge plot, they would also know the following -that the murder will be avenged, and that the revenger too will die. Yet this knowledge would constitute a special kind of problem, for the death of the hero would also be the closure of the causal plot: when 'he' died, the play would end.
The hero, who must be given a general level of knowledge equivalent to that of the audience (in order to be a 'hero' at all -a qualification that Othello reverses), and who would therefore be capable (through his long study of drama and his own skill as an amateur dramaturge) of understanding his own position and the particular implications of his 'fate' (since 'all the world is but a play,' and his is a revenge), would then also know that the act of revenge would lead ultimately and inevitably to his own death. He might then seek to postpone it (at least until the fifth act), thus creating a new game built upon the audience's very expectation of his death, a game, not of what should happen, since the rules of causality make that clear, but of what will-whether the certainty of that 'fate' will be avoided. Such a play is Hamlet, a play in which the unwillingness of the hero to precipitate the act of revenge is his unwillingness to advance a chain of causality that will lead inevitably to his own death. Hamlet's notorious 'indecision' postpones not only the death of Claudius, but its other consequences -his own death and the 'death J or closure of the play itself. And it is thus by this delay that the play exists at all.
The problem of 'plot' as Hamlet presents it is that, since the audience is now fully convinced of the 'causality' of the actions of the plot and can no longer be entertained by its demonstration, the structure of the play is reduced to three essential actions -the crime, which initiates the play, and the revenge and death of the revenger, which they know must follow. The reduction of the fully causal plot to these three elements results in a paradox: the play must delay those actions that would complete it (the revenge, the death of the revenger) until the fifth act, since to present them immediately would be to end the play. The delay thus constructs a space between beginning arid closing, through which the play exists, but exists primarily as a space. And since only those actions that are postponed to the end are, within the logical structure of the plot, significant, this space is defined, at least in plot terms, by the very necessity of its insignificance. Thus though 'delay' performs a very similar structural function in both The Spanish Tragedy and Hamlet, it does so for nearly opposite reasons, arising in the first play because the hero 'does not know what to do' and, in the second, because he knows only too well where his actions must lead. 23 The temporal assumptions of these plays are nearly opposite, their difference pointing towards a very significant reformation in the Renaissance conception of time.
This difference is also significant in its effects on the notion of 'character' or 'the individual.' It is within the space of this delay, created by the postponement of the ending and the necessity of the play to extend itself in time in order 'to be' at all, that the character 'Hamlet' exists, and it is through his existence that that space is defined and given shape. Thus 'Hamlet' the character exists, in the most naked of terms, only as a marker for that delay and the space it creates: by 'delaying,' Hamlet creates a space in which 'to be,' and by 'being,' he defines that space so that we know that it is there. Hamlet becomes a famous metaphysical puzzle precisely in that we are intrigued to watch that space reflect upon its own existence as a space (since it cannot 'act'), filling the time before it is to die with that reflection (a fitting metaphor for life!). Yet these reflections are in themselves an illusion: though their very consideration constructs a 'character' (Hamlet himself), the 'metaphysical' questions of Hamlet can never be resolved in the ontological terms of 'character' in which they are offered, since by very nature they point to the definition of 'character' in terms of 'plot' -terms that make the very notion of ontological or 'pre-extant' character itself virtually impossible. And it is at this point that Hamlet balances on the edge of a very radical critique of the very notion of 'individuality' that it appears to be advancing, a critique from which Shakespeare routinely withdraws: Hamlet succeeds at being 'existential/ without ceasing to be 'individual' -all while preserving, through an elaborate system of diversions and misdirections, the illusion of accidents, 'random' actions, and the possibility of 'free will. '24 As with the later Iago, the one explanation that could be given for his condition is the one he cannot speak -that he exists at all only in order to allow for the situation that has created him. The play does not exist, as Hamlet's dying speech implies, to tell the story of 'Hamlet': it is rather the character 'Hamlet' who exists in order to have a play, and it is this necessity 'to have a play' -an ambition singularly self-defining and self-serving -that forms the primary motivation of the play's structure in the exigencies of its institutional framework, the developing form of drama. To this extent, the metaphysical questions of Hamlet are ingenuous: when Hamlet remarks 'the readiness is all/ he notes, on one level, not their resolution, but rather the pragmatic arrival of the play at the fifth act in which their deliberation and delay no longer serve a useful purpose. Renaissance drama, in progressing beyond this point, spoke to a point that was to shape one of the major conceptual debates of the seventeenth century and the Reformation as a whole: if the sequential notion of causal times were to be fully understood and thus become available to the understanding as a complete and static pattern (the determinism of Calvin), then human will and the illusion of freedom would become largely insignificant. But this was a conceptual dilemma from which other, more pragmatic representational systems consistently withdrew, favouring planning and the definition of the 'hero' within the truncated 'causality' of his own career and 'fate/ which then emerged as dominant concerns.
Hamlet marks a crucial point in the function of Renaissance drama as a pedagogy of causality and time. It marks precisely that point at which the functions of 'causality' are fully revealed, and that point at which the definition of the 'character' and his 'fate' (which is nothing less than the 'causality' and narrative necessity of the plot itself) are fully coextensive and appear to be identical. And this is its true illusion -that the 'fate' of the hero is precisely coextensive with his actions. Hamlet thus represents that point at which the hero, freed from his bondage to feudal relations of obligation and place, appeared as 'individual,' but had not yet been reabsorbed into the conceptual economy of a more extended system of bourgeois relations and planning. He thus became available to the bourgeoisie retrospectively as an icon of their 'identity' and 'heroism' -as 'better than they really are' by his very freedom from their quotidian concerns. 25
It is precisely the irony of Hamlet, however, that the very terms of the 'heroism' it enunciated destroyed the very basis of the revenge plot itself: Shakespeare's activity, which was not the rejection, but the more complete statement of revenge 'syntax,' removed its operative condition, which was ignorance before causal sequence. Fully understood, as Nietzsche was later to remark, the 'causality' of that plot could not be other than alien and inimical to the very concept of 'character' it had created. The primacy of 'plot' over 'character' in tragedy, for which Aristotle so adamantly argued, meant inevitably that the 'hero' and 'the individual' exist in tragedy only to die -a role dependent, not upon knowledge, but upon ignorance (it is not for nothing that the moment of anagnorisis or 'recognition' is either coincident with, or following that of peripeteia or 'reversal of situation' in Aristotle's scheme 26 ): it was therefore the realization of this very 'causality' that made further rational participation in tragedy virtually impossible. 27 Once the audience understood this simple fact, their separation from the hero, locked in his ignorance, could only grow increasingly profound.
Later plays, such as Othello, or more parodically Jonson's Epicoene, were based upon the very absurdity of this realization: Othello, the hero whose very ignorance of his fate must be predicated upon both the reduction of his stature and his alienation from the audience through the play's fundamental racism, falls victim to an Iago who represents the somewhat arbitrary and unmotivated 'causality' of the emerging New Comic plot, just as Morose, the withdrawn and 'heroic' individual of Epicoene falls victim to the witty plotters who are his comic replacement. Thus the very engagement of Hamlet in such a deterministic pattern, a pattern that may be delayed but not ultimately circumvented, marks a final kind of victory for the form of drama itself and its implicit notions of time: the isolated individual, the 'hero' who is able to determine his own fate by acting, was possible after Hamlet only in a radically altered and circumscribed form. Sequential time had become an assumption, and heroes in sequential time are defined, not by their failure, but by their success.
PROGRESSION AND DECADENCE
Greek tragedy met an end different from that of her older sister arts; she died by suicide, in consequence of an irreconcilable conflict; she died tragically, while all the others passed away calmly and beautifully at a ripe old age. 28 The entry of the tragic hero into the world of time and consequence was that which created the hero as an 'individual' and that which made him heroic, but it was also that which ultimately destroyed him, not only within the temporal inevitability of the individual play, but more generally as well: temporality, fcausality,' and the plot structure that represent them eventually rendered impossible the very basis for tragic action.
Heroes of Renaissance revenge tragedies are typically characters who are initially defined by their places in a feudal order: often they are military men distinguished by loyal subservience (as are Hieronimo of The Spanish Tragedy, Titus Andronicus of Titus Andronicus, and Othello). Yet, typically, it is precisely the action of the play to remove this sense of definition by place, enforcing ftragic isolation': cut off from the normal ties of their feudal definition through the rejection of services or position (the rejection of their princes, their displacement in an orderly succession of feudal roles, or their racial exclusion from social acceptance), their family relations severed through death or disloyalty or betrayal (real or assumed), they begin to become visible as findividuals,' defined not by their location within this network of secure relations, but by their apparent isolation against the shifting background of action into which even those former relations are absorbed: 'place' eroded, they come to be defined by their 'fate.' This shift in the basis for the definition of character, from the stability of social role to the fluidity of action, cause, and effect, is a shift in kind. These characters, as residual members of a world or representational system in which identity was constructed by older methods, awake within a world in which the rules of the game have changed -the world of 'plot' and the play.
It is tempting to identify the appearance of the 'individuality' of the hero with the rise of the bourgeoisie, but this identification is only partially accurate: though revenge tragedies typically do violate the classical tradition of locating the hero among the nobility and assign value to the hero at least partially on the basis of bourgeois criteria such as technical expertise and class aspiration (Othello being the most extreme example in his martial expertise and racial exclusion from 'legitimate' membership in the elite; Hamlet at least partially defined by his obsessive literacy), the revenge hero is 'tragic' precisely in that he is not bourgeois, having not internalized the first principle of bourgeois conceptual economy, which is the very centrality of causality itself and the planning upon which it is predicated. Causality to the revenge hero always appears as something alien and external -a bad turn to events. But to the bourgeois hero, causality is both fundamental and assumed: it is the very principle of investment that governs his/her entire life -action taken for future effect based upon predictive notions of causal success.
This difference is central: the revenge hero accepts as utterly necessary the sufficiency of revenge as a motive, an acceptance based upon the feudal claims of family and fealty that must be acknowledged without regard to cost. The hero regards the avenging of the death of a leader or relation as a necessary (if unpleasant, in the case of Hamlet) obligation, the discharge of which is an affirmation of that entire social structure upon which his personal definition depends. It is only a matter of secondary and emergent importance that this act of duty and affirmation has consequences, and that those consequences lead to his own death. Yet as 'plot' and 'causality' become conventionalized and accepted, the notion of consequence and the definition of identity within it moves into a position of centrality that redefines the entire idea of revenge. In this respect, the shift from The Spanish Tragedy to Hamlet appears once again not as a rejection of the syntax of revenge but as its very fulfilment.
The logical result of this progression in a post-Hamlet world is finally the emergence of the truly bourgeois hero who refuses revenge as simply irrelevant to his concerns and functions 'individually' towards different ends and new obligations -precisely those of personal futurity, investment, acquisition, and prosperity. Thus, for instance, the most truly 'alone' of bourgeois heroes, Robinson Crusoe, cannot be 'tragic' because he understands (or at least believes he must come to understand) most thoroughly the 'causality' that has resulted in his position. Finding barley, he asserts divine providence. Remembering the shaking of a grain sack, he recounts causality. Crediting God with the very presence of the sack, he internalizes that causality within his god, thus encapsulating not only the transition to temporal sequence and causality, but the religious history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and its accordant transition to deism. Nature can be and often is alien and hostile within this conceptual framework, but causality itself is not, since as 'method,' it replaces Nature as a context for action, and leads inevitably to a 'happy' ending in the domination both of nature and of those non-causal creatures that inhabit it.
Within this truly bourgeois framework, the very notion of revenge is atavistic, since its causality so clearly works to its maker's disadvantage: the most obvious message in Hamlet is simply that there is no profit in revenge. Bourgeois characters do not live 'within' causality, as uncomprehending victims of its operations: they live rather through causality in a causal world, and it is through this understanding, post-tragic in its very nature, that they prosper. Thus, ironically, it is the very notion of 'tragic' identity that the realizations of revenge tragedy itself eventually renders obsolete. The characters of revenge, to the sophisticated audiences who have absorbed its conventions, become as antiquated and creaky as Hamlet's ghost:
FAC. Thou must borrow, A Spanish suite. Hast thou no credit with the players? DRV. Yes, sir, did you neuer see me play the foole? FAC. I know not, NAB: thou shalt, if I can helpe it.
HIERONIMO~S old cloake, ruffe, and hat will serue ... a onson, Alchemist, IV. vii. [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] The heirs to the tragic tradition, as Nietzsche noted, are not further tragedies, but their parody in the plays of Menander, Terence, Plautus, Jonson, and, to some extent Euripides. New Comedy, which reprises the relationships of tragedy in a trivialized and parodic form, restructures identity into the institutionalized 'individuality' of idiosyncratic types. 29 . Even in such late Renaissance revenge tragedies as Tourneur's The Revenger's Tragedy, this process of trivialization and parody is clear: the revenge hero, now trivialized, controls action like his New Comic counterpart. And that action, now fully 'causal' and mechanical, appears to operate almost irrespective of its characters' involvements. Automatic and formal but largely senseless, its operation appears stripped of any larger 'metaphysical' meanings.
The traditional madness of the hero, passing from Hieronimo of The Spanish Tragedy through Hamlet to Othello and Lear, may be seen as a varying response to these conditions. Like the 'passion' that prompts Balthazar to action, it provides, on the one hand, a ready a priori motivation for the hero's actions as responses to the intensity of the moment, explicable, therefore, in terms of 'character' alone and thus defiant towards the encroaching definition of the hero through 'plot.' Yet in the later stages of the development of revenge tragedy, as the causality of plot becomes explicit, the very 'irrationality' of this madness begins to form a kind of critique of plot itself: plot, though 'logical' and 'rational' in terms of its 'objective' linkage through 'causal necessity,' can hardly be considered 'rational' from the standpoint of the hero, for whom it represents only the logic of extinction.
But perhaps most significantly, the initial 'madness' of the hero may be seen as a reaction to the very type of consistency demanded by plot structure itself: Eric Havelock has argued that the lack of consistency that Socrates found objectionable in Homer's gods was a normal structuring of identity under the conditions of pre literate Homeric society. It became objectionable only in the transition to a more 'literate' society in which consistency, enforced through documentation, became the moral norm: the 'irrationality' of the hero thus appears significant only in a context that presupposes the 'rationality' of logical consistency as a base structurethe 'rationality' of literacy itself, which the emerging plot structure of revenge tragedy so readily encapsulates. It is within this context that the 'inconsistency' of the hero, doomed by its very logic, appears at once so atavistic and yet so curiously understandable -the hero of revenge exists, ultimately, not to kill, but to die, as the fully causal hero migrated to more favourable circumstances (the Restoration comedy, the novel of individuallives and accomplishments, Paradise Lost and Regained), the death of the 'hero' locked within the patterns of revenge could only appear increasingly senseless and pathetic (witness Dr Johnson's reactions to Lear). Revenge could appear tragic, in retrospect, only for a 'subject' defined within this outdated notion of causality and time, or as a retrospective ideal of a kind of innocence no longer supported by events.
In the later sections of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche argued that 'it is the fate of every myth to creep by degrees into the narrow limits of some alleged historical reality, and to be treated by some later generation as a unique fact with historical claims.'3 0 But this is a fate, perhaps, only shared by those myths that survive within cultures that have begun to construe 'history' as the defining context for their operations. The irony of tragedy is that, while it helped to construct the very circumstances that made a concept such as 'history' possible, it could function within that history only as an artifact of the past. 
